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THE MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RE-
SPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND COR-
PORATE RIGHTS. By Larry May.t Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 200. $23.95. 
Michael Levin 2 
Well before finishing The Morality of Groups-well before 
opening it, in fact-I predicted to myself from the title alone that 
Professor Larry May would reach the following conclusions: 
I. Groups do not exactly exist but they do not exactly not exist. 
2. Groups exist enough to be harmed, with sex stereotyping the paradigmatic ex-
ample of such harm. 
3. By the same token, groups exist enough to justify group-based compensation 
for disadvantaged groups (paradigmatically blacks and women) even when this 
overrides individual rights. 
4. Groups also exist enough to render organizations liable for the misdeeds of a 
few of their officers. 
5. On the other hand, groups don't exist enough to create immuniti~s for profit-
seeking organizations. 
Imagine my satisfaction, then, when my reading confirmed 
that Professor May holds every one of these positions. Not that I 
was perfectly prescient: I failed to anticipate his defense of publicly 
funded class-action litigation, or his advocacy of special rights and 
immunities for the NAACP when this conflicts with the free speech 
of "racist individuals." Still, my success raises a question: how did 
I know so much? 
There are two hypotheses that may explain the data. First, 
perhaps all five positions are self-evident, so that May, being a com-
petent philosopher, could be trusted to arrive at them. Alterna-
tively, perhaps May, like many "applied ethicists" in academe, is 
committed a priori to preferences for blacks and women, and dis-
likes business, so the only uncertainty is the manner in which he 
will try to justify his commitments. 
How is one to decide between these two hypotheses? The first 
hypothesis predicts that May's arguments will be so overwhelming 
as to make a reader wonder why anyone remains attached to indi-
vidualistic justice. If, on the other hand, May's arguments are post 
hoc justifications for conclusions reached beforehand, these argu-
ments may be expected to be weak and unconvincing; our second 
hypothesis predicts that May will skate over difficulties with un-
I. Associate Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University. 
2. Professor of Philosophy. City College of New York and the Graduate Center of the 
City University of New York. 
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seemly haste, equivocate at crucial junctures, avert his gaze from 
logical muddle, and avoid inconvenient facts. This, I regret to say, 
is the hypothesis supported by most of the evidence in The Morality 
of Groups. 
May realizes that the moral status of groups awaits a determi-
nation of their ontological status. Groups cannot act, suffer, or de-
serve recompense unless they exist. Indeed, the most cogent 
objection to "group rights" and "group debts" has always been 
skepticism on this point of ontology. Social reality, for the "meth-
odological individualist," consists of interrelated individuals; talk of 
groups is a convenient fiction not to be taken literally at the level of 
serious causal or moral analysis. There's nobody here but us peo-
ple. Although moral ascriptions depend heavily on the relations 
people bear to each other, it is to individuals alone that these ascrip-
tions ultimately apply. I cannot owe my grocer money unless I 
have a grocer, but it is still I, not the dyad composed of the grocer 
and myself, who carry the debt. This spare ontology, continues the 
individualist, is also the more morally enlightened. Reification of 
groups in earlier times led individuals to be treated on the basis of 
the groups to which they belonged rather than their own merits. 
Because in fact there are no groups, this reification required in effect 
that people be judged for the actions of others to whom they might 
be quite adventitiously related. It is somewhat disturbing that May 
wishes to demonstrate the existence of groups precisely to get us to 
"reconsider ... these moral conceptions [of] Germanic tribal and 
feudal societies." 
A group is an entity over and above its constituent individuals, 
says May, if (and only if) the putative properties of the group are 
more than mere sums of the properties of its constituents. As a 
special case of this criterion, a group exists if there are properties of 
its members that can be explained only by reference to membership 
in the group itself. In May's words, social groups must be recog-
nized because a phenomenon like group solidarity "is not itself 
merely a function of the individual psychological states of the mem-
bers of the group." This, in turn, means that 
group members aid one another in significant ways and thereby enable one another 
to act differently than they could act on their own .... The capacities of individuals 
change when they are mixed together with other individuals. This change is best 
captured, it seems to me, by reference to the structure of the group. 
Because groups exist insofar as individuals in groups act, think, and 
suffer in ways they would not by themselves, May defines groups to 
be "individuals in relationships." It is not so much groups as rela-
tions among individuals which have "a distinct ontological status 
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which is different from the individuals related." By shifting the 
ontological burden to relations, May arrives at "a middle position, 
one in which it is possible to give both a qualified 'yes' and a quali-
fied 'no' to the question: 'Do social groups exist?' " In other words, 
they don't exactly exist and they don't exactly not exist. 
May uses his criterion not only to demonstrate the existence of 
mobs, corporations, and oppressed groups (more or less equated 
with blacks and females), but also to identify the modes of group 
agency. Groups intend and act (and bear responsibility) because 
the intentions and actions of each member reflect the intentions and 
actions of other members, with corporations acting "vicariously" 
through their officers. Groups like women and South African 
blacks can be harmed because injury to each member is transmitted, 
according to May, to every other member via their physical resem-
blance: "An additive, or cumulative, account of the pervasiveness 
of sexual discrimination does not give adequate emphasis to the 
links between the various harms inflicted upon individual women." 
To explain how woman A, not "directly" touched by discrimination 
against woman B or any other woman, may nonetheless be said to 
be harmed, he reasons that Ms. A would have suffered discrimina-
tion had she been in Ms. B 's position. (By the same token, I sup-
pose, a flowerpot falling on Mr. X indirectly harms me because it 
would have brained me had I been standing where Mr. X was, and a 
university that hires me must indirectly benefit all similarly quali-
fied philosophers who would have been hired had they applied for 
the job I received.) The beneficiary of group harm to women is, of 
course, "the group 'men.' " 
May relies on his criterion even when seemingly arbitrarily 
changing his mind about which groups exist. Thus, after having 
argued that corporations can intend, act, and incur liability because 
"the corporate decision-making structure" is needed to explain the 
behavior of corporate officers, he maintains that corporations have 
no interests (and thus greatly reduced rights claims) because 
the corporation's interests in realizing its goals [are] merely a summation of the 
interests of the current and perhaps past, employees, managers, and stockhold· 
ers .... [T]he corporation's interests [are] a mere aggregation of the interests of its 
members. 
May is able to play so fast and loose because the old conun-
drum, "Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts?," and conse-
quently May's position on it, is in fact hopelessly confused. 
Whether a property of a whole is or is not the sum of the properties 
of its parts depends upon what is to count as a property of a part 
and how part-properties are to be added. Water, unlike hydrogen 
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or oxygen, is a liquid at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit. If the 
properties of hydrogen and oxygen are limited to their atomic 
weights, atomic numbers, and physical states at one hundred de-
grees Fahrenheit, the properties of water are irreducible to those of 
hydrogen and oxygen. But if "combines with oxygen to form a liq-
uid at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit" is taken as a property of 
hydrogen, the liquidity of water is explained by the properties of its 
components. And it is surely arbitrary to include the atomic weight 
of hydrogen among its "individual states" while excluding its ten-
dency to form a liquid with hydrogen. The reference to oxygen in 
the description of hydrogen's combining properties is consistent 
with those combining properties being "individual states," for a hy-
drogen molecule in splendid isolation, miles from any oxygen, is 
still disposed to combine with oxygen. Indeed, all the world's oxy-
gen is presently disposed to react in definite ways to transuranium 
elements that may never exist. The "intrinsic" gaseousness of hy-
drogen at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit, for its part, is specified 
by reference to the Fahrenheit scale, and perhaps to Herr Fahren-
heit himself. 
The border surrounding "individual" states is even less clear 
when the states in question are psychological. Robinson Crusoe 
would doubtless have enjoyed a different outlook on life had he 
found his island already occupied by a contingent from Club Med, 
but this shows the irreducibility of group psychology to individual 
psychology only if "individual psychological states" are those that 
are not caused by other individuals. May in fact flirts with such a 
definition in his final pages without realizing that it would trivialize 
his overall thesis. All familiar human conduct becomes "group-
based" if the only "individual" statues are those belonging to or-
phans raised on desert islands, in which case "individual" and 
"group-based" marks no distinction within ordinary moral experi-
ence. Or consider May's gloss on the Watts rioters: 
The intentions displayed by such social groups ... [such as] beating white motor-
ists, and overturning cars and setting fire to them ... may be treated as if they were 
collective, since they arise out of the relations and structures of the group. . . . [T]he 
intentions and goals of some or most of the mob members are different from their 
intentions and goals as individuals. And while the change in their intentions is still 
a change in their individual intentions, it is the group structure that has brought 
about this change .... [E]ach member of the group comes to have the same inten-
tion, either reflectively or pre-reflectively, and this is different from what their indi-
vidual intentions would be if they were not members of the group. The sameness of 
intention is collective in the sense that it is caused by the group structure, that is, it 
is group based3 
3. May's source for his description of the Watts riots is M. BROWN & A. GOLDIN, 
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR (1973). He cites without demur their assessment of the riots as a 
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Now, while no rioter would have formed the intention of attacking 
white motorists absent other rampaging blacks, each rioter taken 
singly was already disposed to attack white motorists if accompa-
nied by other rampaging blacks. This prior disposition, whose 
existence is shown by its subsequent manifestations and whose 
physical basis is no doubt some currently unknown state of the ner-
vous system, is surely an "individual psychological state." Each in-
dividual rioter's intention to attack white motorists can therefore be 
explained with equal cogency as the action of other individuals on 
his individual psychology. The reference to group structure be-
comes superfluous. 
My point is not the superiority of individualistic to group ex-
planations, but the arbitrariness of classifying explanations as one 
or the other. There can be no fixed criterion for group action or 
group existence until "property of an individual" is adequately 
specified. Apparently unfamiliar with the technical literature on 
this problem,4 and certainly not concerned to offer a consistent defi-
nition of his own, May is free to construe "individual state" as suits 
his convenience. Even though the interests of corporate officers re-
flect their corporate positions just as surely as the interests of blacks 
reflect their membership in the NAACP, May counts the height-
ened salience of each member of the NAACP as a group effect but 
the interests of corporate officers as "individually separate." It is 
then an easy step for him to grant to the NAACP a package of first 
amendment rights he has denied to corporations. (To be sure, May 
also enlists the logically irrelevant contention that the NAACP 
serves more socially desirable interests than does a corporation.) 
This is what I mean by averting one's gaze from logical muddle. 
But suppose these criticisms are wrong. Suppose there are 
non-arbitrary criteria according to which groups exist and display 
moral properties. What follows? Should groups possess constitu-
tional rights? If so, when are those rights weightier than individual 
rights? Here The Morality of Groups will disappoint readers, espe-
cially legal readers accustomed to analyses constructed to vindicate 
one side or the other of concrete disputes. For the most part May 
response to ··an assault on a vulnerable and helpless community by a powerful representative 
of white colonial interests'' (i.e., the police). To judge by May's citations, every riotous act 
was provoked by police misbehavior. 
4. The relativity of reduction to choice of part-properties and modes of aggregation 
was emphasized as long ago as 1942 by Henle, The Status of Emergence, 391. OF PHIL 486 
(1942); see a/so C. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 260-62 (1965); E. 
NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE ch. II ( 1961). In M. LEVIN, METAPHYSICS AND THE 
MIND-BODY PROBLEM ( 1979), I suggest that a property of a whole is intuitively reducible to 
properties of its parts when both whole and part-properties are among continuum-many de-
terminations of the same determinable; other authors have made related suggestions. 
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avoids definitive judgments altogether, being content to reiterate un-
helpfully that groups "should be recognized as having at least some 
form of standing to make legitimate moral or legal claims." Indeed, 
upon reviewing the one problem May considers in detail, and ex-
tending his account to a sample of issues left undiscussed, it be-
comes clear that group rights have not been shown to play any role 
whatever in legal reasoning. In any case, May's failure to test his 
theory in a variety of cases is a major weakness of his book. 
May considers the dilemma of a Legal Services Corporation 
lawyer who must choose between taking a divorce case and a chal-
lenge to a power company's policy of shutoff upon nonpayment. 
The first case affects the prospective client only, whereas the second 
case reaches beyond the prospective client to other members of his 
group, namely everyone sufficiently in arrears on his gas bill. The 
LSC lawyer, contends May, is clearly permitted to choose to litigate 
the shutoff case if winning it will secure the rights of many people. 
According to May, an individualist-by contrast-would treat each 
individual petitioner as equally entitled to the LSC's attention. No-
tice, however, that May's argument-whatever the merits of its 
conclusion-does not oppose the rights of the individual divorce-
seeker to any group right; it opposes the rights of the individual 
divorce-seeker (to access to the LSC and thence the divorce courts) 
to the aggregated rights of many individual subscribers to the power 
company. For May, as for a commonsensical individualist, the 
choice is made after balancing the rights and interests of indi-
viduals. 
Or consider affirmative action, a topic close to the heart of 
May's position but one on which he is curiously silent. According 
to group rights theory, does the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment require State U. to favor black applicants to its 
law school as compensation for past injury? Offhand, the answer 
would seem to be an unequivocal "yes," especially if it is granted 
that the group blacks have indeed been injured. Because blacks as a 
group were injured, every black has a claim against ... whom? 
Blacks as a group have a claim against whites as a group-a claim 
against every white-only if every white benefitted from those inju-
ries, a proposition which is by no means self-evident. It certainly 
cannot be assumed that all blacks have suffered and all whites have 
benefitted to precisely the same extent: justice in the law school 
case depends on the precise harm to the particular black applicants 
and the precise gains wrongfully accrued by their particular white 
competitors-a determination which cannot be made simply by 
chanting the "group rights" mantra. Recall, furthermore, that ac-
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cording to May, group harm creates "some form of standing to 
make a legitimate legal claim," not an indefeasible entitlement; the 
vagueness of May's formulation allows the harm done to qualified 
whites to counterbalance the blacks' claims to compensation, and 
the harm to society of abandoning merit standards to offset what 
may (or may not) be the demands of justice. In short, recognition 
of group rights does nothing to meet any of the familiar objections 
to affirmative action. If these objections are inadequate, it is not 
because they are overwhelmed by "group rights." 
Finally, does the group vulnerability of women warrant consti-
tutional protection of their "equality of rights under the law," as the 
Equal Rights Amendment promises? Well, whether all women are 
vulnerable just by virtue of their womanhood is an empirical issue 
which the concept of group rights is incapable of addressing, how-
ever much its language may suggest a positive answer. Even assum-
ing a prima facie case for the ERA based upon the group concept, a 
host of other familiar questions remain: would the ERA require 
conscripting women for combat if men are conscripted? Would it 
eliminate tax exemptions for churches that do not ordain women? 
If the answers are "yes," would the ERA inflict too much damage 
on the social fabric? If the answer is "the courts will decide," is it a 
good idea to give the judiciary this kind of authority? The group 
rights perspective adds nothing to our understanding of these 
questions. 
May delivers so much less than he promises because he, like 
everyone else, must in the end base all ascriptions of intent, harm, 
fault, and desert on the ascription of these categories to individuals. 
As our discussions of equal access, affirmative action, and the ERA 
suggest, raising moral issues in group terms is a gigantic distraction, 
a mug's game. It is all very well to hold "Yale University" respon-
sible for sexual harassment, as May does,s but individuals-employ-
ees, managers, directors, CEOs, shareholders, trustees, blacks and 
whites, males and females-remain the malefactors and benefi-
5. Here is sexual harassment as May imagines it: "Professor Smith calls in one of his 
graduate students, Ms. Jones, and says Td like you to sleep with me. If you won't. I'll make 
sure you lose your assistantship.' . . . Assume that in this instance, Professor Smith had 
threatened graduate students before, and word of this travelled to the Chairman, the Dean, 
and the Vice President, yet they had said nothing to Professor Smith or to any of his graduate 
students." To begin with, it is extremely unlikely that Smith's superiors would take no action 
in the circumstance described. Well before the concept of "sexual harassment" was invented, 
such conduct would have been severely penalized, and some professors were reprimanded 
merely for asking a student for a date. More telling is May's apparent unfamiliarity with the 
dynamics of desire. Flat-footed declarations of lust simply don't happen. A real "Professor 
Smith" would at least try to be a little more seductive, and his excitement would be likely to 
abate if unreciprocated. Improper advances occur, but the truth is more nuanced than May 
seems to recognize. 
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ciaries, the ultimate winners and losers of all such judgments. Logi-
cally, May's position is compatible with any canon of judgment, 
including conventional ones; it merely reformulates these canons 
and their attendant problems in more obscure language. For in-
stance, a corporation turns out to be "vicariously negligent" if "ap-
propriate members of the corporation failed to take preventive 
measures" they could have "reasonably" foreseen to be necessary. 
(May seems to favor sanctions against the "appropriate members of 
the corporation" when corporations are liable.) This again tells us 
nothing new. The main problem in negligence theory is the difficult 
concept of reasonableness, and a detour through "vicarious" negli-
gence leaves us no better able to assess reasonableness in concrete 
cases than we were before. 
It is here that the tendentiousness of group language gives it 
the appearance of content. Group-think does yield moral novelty 
via novel theories of fact. By exaggerating the cohesiveness of select 
groups it makes a showing of harm (selectively) easier and defenses 
against fault (selectively) more difficult. This slide from group-
think into fiction is well illustrated by May's long (4500-word) ac-
count of sex stereotypes. May certainly does his cause little good by 
selecting the socialization of women as the most salient example he 
can think of a "high standing group-based wrong" in a world in 
which mass slaughters are appallingly frequent. He is also quite 
wrong in maintaining that women exhibit the "three plausible inter-
relationships" that, according to him, facilitate group harm, namely 
"shared group consciousness, confined primary relationships, and 
distinctive cultural heritage." May has fallen into the trap of think-
ing of women as a cohesive minority. 
What, in any case, is wrong with stereotypic generalizations 
about, say, women and blacks? May condemns stereotypes partly 
because they lead the members of stereotyped groups to be "treated 
as if they had no individuality, as if there were no salient differences 
among members of the group." Of course, this is not literally true; 
despite extant stereotypes about black criminality, a black jaywalker 
is treated more leniently than a black murderer. What May seems 
to mean is that stereotypes are bad because they are "unjust" to 
their exceptions. And this is where May fails to make some crucial 
distinctions. In discussing stereotypes, the first question is whether 
(and in what sense) the stereotype is true as a generalization. If it is, 
then it's ridiculous to deplore the stereotype as a thought (that takes 
due account of exceptions) though it may (or may not, depending 
on the circumstances) be appropriate to deplore social behavior 
based on the assumption that a given individual will or may con-
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form to the stereotype in a given situation. The stereotype that 
blacks are disproportionately likely to be criminals is true. Never-
theless, to incarcerate Jesse Jackson without a trial, because he is 
black, would be improper. If, however, the question is whether a 
driver should discriminate between young black hitchhikers in cas-
ual clothes and elderly white hitchhikers in three-piece suits, the 
answer may be different and is certainly more problematic. 
Most stereotypes, including all those cited by May, are true at 
the observational level. All the great scientific geniuses have been 
men, as have the overwhelming majority of ordinary scientists and 
engineers. In this sense, the stereotype about the male's greater 
originality and abstract rationality is empirically warranted, as are 
the stereotypes about the male's greater aggressiveness (war and vi-
olent crime are practically a male monopoly), black rhythm (blacks 
invented rhythm 'n' blues, jazz, and rap music), and Jewish clever-
ness (ever notice the number of Jewish lawyers?). Not all Jews are 
clever, of course, yet Jews are disproportionately represented in the 
law, and that is what the stereotype correctly captures. It should 
also be noted that stereotypes may depart from literal truth by im-
plying an evaluation of the stereotyped trait. Thus, May character-
izes the conventional belief about Jews as the stereotype that they 
are "cunning." Once it is recognized that "cunning" is a name be-
stowed on such cleverness as the speaker dislikes, it again becomes 
clear that the factual core of this stereotype is correct, however 
much one may properly object to the pejorative innuendo of "cun-
ning." Whether the presence of a stereotypic trait is relevant to 
how one should treat a particular individual in a particular situation 
is of course a different question, and no doubt stereotypes (true and 
false) can be misused-but caution in their use should not require 
us to deny evident facts. 
Critics of stereotyping usually don't confine themselves to such 
banal, commonsensical observations as the need for caution. For 
example, some critics admit the truth of stereotypes but assert that 
they are true only because they are believed, mere self-fulfilling 
prophecies which stunt individual development. This approach is 
vulnerable to scientific findings, which often prove or strongly sug-
gest that group traits are primarily biological, not social, in origin. 
On the one hand, the failure of women to enter the legal profession 
in large numbers before the 1970s was clearly due to social rather 
than biological causes (although calling a cause "social" does not 
necessarily make it discriminatory or oppressive). On the other 
hand, male aggressiveness is produced by the action of hormones on 
the fetal brain, not primarily by the viewing of Clint Eastwood mov-
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ies. 6 Boys still regularly outscore girls on tests of mathematical 
ability and other indicators of abstract reasoning ability, even 
though textbooks now go to great lengths to cast women in tradi-
tional male roles. 7 The verbal IQ of Jews of European ancestry is 
one hundred thirteen, the highest of any known ethnic group.s 
Granted, biological differences are sometimes reinforced by social 
conditioning. Still, the list of exploded social-origin theories is very 
long. 
At several points, May grasps the much more precarious horn 
of the dilemma; rather than attributing the truth of stereotypes to 
social causes, he claims that stereotypes are simply false. He writes: 
"Stereotyping of a group of persons occurs when a model or type is 
created from a composite of the characteristics of a few group mem-
bers." The generalization, in other words, is invalid even if taken as 
a generalization. At other times, he hedges his denial with impene-
trable echelons of qualifiers, as when he describes women as vulner-
able to stereotyping because "[t]he members of this group are 
defined as having certain characteristics which many, if not most, of 
the individuals may not have," and despairs that "it is very difficult 
to convince people on an intellectual level, on the level of statistics 
and data, that they have generalized incorrectly." Given the empir-
ical reliability of the central sex stereotypes, and their validation by 
science, the reader is entitled to at least one example of these "sta-
tistics and data." May provides none. He simply insinuates stereo-
types away, and with them a vast body of research inconsistent with 
the empirical foundations of his view of society. This is what I 
meant by a half-conscious avoidance of inconvenient facts.9 
There is no question that belief in group rights informs current 
public policy. Some such theory is necessary to confer the appear-
ance of sense on penalties for individually innocent white males and 
benefits to individually undamaged blacks and women. It is cause 
for reflection that, in less than three decades, the quest for civil 
rights has led us back to feudal Germany. 
6. See Erhardt & Meyer-Biauberg, Effects of Prenatal Hormones on Gender-Related 
Behavior, 211 SCIENCE 1312 (1984). 
7. See Benbow & Stanley, Sex Differences in Mathematical Ability: Fact or Amfact?, 
210 SciENCE 1262 (1980). 
8. See Gordon & Rudert, Bad News Concerning IQ Tests, 52 Soc. OF Eouc. 174 
(1979). 
9. May does not even go through the motions of denying the empirical validity of 
stereotypes about blacks, simply passing over the question in silence. 
